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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction in this appeal is proper in the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (e), as an appeal from a court of record not involving a first
degree or capital felony.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
I.

Did trial counsel's failure to object to the jury instructions which lacked a mens
rea instruction, operate to deny Appellant effective assistance of counsel
guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution?
i. Standard of Review. Plain Error, State v. Verde, 770 P. 2d 116 (Utah
1989).
ii. Preservation of Issue. Where a jury instruction was not objected to at
trial, appellate review is still possible when an error should have been
obvious to the trial court and is sufficiently harmful to require reversal.

II.

Did trial counsel's failure to object to the questions directed to Airman Lyon
asking if Geukgeuzian knew that Lyon heard him make threats against his
estranged wife, operate to deny Geukgeuzian effective assistance of counsel as
guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution?
i. Standard of Review. Plain Error, State v. Verde, 770 P. 2d 116 (Utah
1989).

ii.

Preservation of Issue. Where objections to testimony were not
made at trial, appellate review is still possible when an error should
have been obvious to the trial court and is sufficiently harmful to
require reversal.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES
The following statute is determinative of the issues or portion thereof addressed in
the respective briefs of the parties. The text of the statute is presented in its entirety in
the Addendum.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature, Proceedings and Disposition Below.
On February 7, 2001, Defendant/Appellant Stephen L. Geukgeuzian

(Geukgeuzian) was convicted of tampering with a witness and making a written false
statement. Geukgeuzian appealed the convictions citing manifest injustice and
ineffective assistance of counsel. This Court upheld Geukgeuzian's conviction for
written false statements and reversed the witness tampering conviction; holding the trial
court's failure to include a mens rea element in its jury instructions resulted in manifest
injustice. Due to this Court's reversal on the manifest injustice claim, Geukgeuzian's
ineffective assistance of counsel claim as to the witness tampering charge was not
addressed. The State appealed and the Utah Supreme Court granted certiorari. The
Supreme Court concluded the errors in the jury instructions were invited by Geukgeuzian
and reversed the decision of this Court. Acknowledging the unresolved issues
2

concerning trial counsel's performance, the Supreme Court remanded the case back to
this Court for further consideration as to whether Geukgeuzian received ineffective
assistance of counsel.
B.

Statement of Facts.
1.

In May of 2000, Geukgeuzian, at the urging of his attorney, approached

several co-workers at Hill Air Force Base, and requested that they write a statement on
Geukgeuzian's behalf in conjunction with an ex-parte protective order filed by
Geukgeuzian's estranged wife. One such co-worker was Airman Jason Lyon ("Lyon").
(Appellate Record, hereinafter R., 00141: 99, 120-121.)
2.

Geukgeuzian asked Lyon to include in his statement whether Geukgeuzian

had made threats against his estranged wife. (R. 00141: 120-125.)
3.

Unbeknownst to Geukgeuzian, Lyon had, approximately one week before,

provided a written statement to the Office of Special Investigations ("OSI") of Hill Air
Force Base wherein he stated, among other things, that he had overheard Geukgeuzian
make threats or speak threateningly against his estranged wife. (R. 00141: 25-29.)
4.

Lyon testified that at no time did Geukgeuzian make any verbal or physical

threats towards him nor did Geukgeuzian promise Lyon anything to induce him to write
the statement. (R. 00141: 56.)
5.

Lyon agreed to write a statement on behalf of Geukgeuzian without voicing

any objection whatsoever. Subsequently, Lyon wrote a statement while he was alone at
his dormitory. He later gave the statement to Geukgeuzian. (R. 00141: 33-34.)

3

6.

Lyon at no time told Geukgeuzian (1) about the OSI investigation; (2) that

Lyon had previously provided a written statement to OSI; (3) that the statement which he
had given to OSI was contrary to the statement he had given to Geukgeuzian; or (4) that
Lyon did not believe what he had written. (R. 00141: 123-25.)
7.

Lyon did not inform his superior officers or any member of OSI that

Geukgeuzian had asked for, and that he had provided him, a written statement. (R.
00141:42-43,46.)
8.

Geukgeuzian provided Lyon's written statement to his attorney Pete Vlahos

who subsequently submitted the same to the Second District Court in a protective order
hearing. (R. 00141: 100.)
9.

Lyon pleaded guilty to giving a false written statement, a Class B

Misdemeanor in exchange for his agreement to testify against Geukgeuzian. (R. 00141:
51-52.)
10.

Defense counsel at trial, Richard J. Culbertson, failed to object to a line of

questioning between the State's attorney and Lyon wherein Lyon testified as to the
personal knowledge and state of mind of defendant. (R. 00141: 31.)
11.

Culbertson passed, without objection, the jury instructions, which were

ultimately given to the jury. (R. 00141: 135-142.)
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
I.

Geukgeuzian was denied effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed by

the United States Constitution when trial counsel's performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness.
a.

Trial counsel's failure to object to the jury instructions that were

obviously flawed in regard to critical elements of the crimes charged constituted
ineffective assistance of counsel.
b.

Trial counsel's failure to object to prosecutor's line of questioning to

Airman Lyon regarding Geukgeuzian's knowledge constituted ineffective assistance of
counsel
ARGUMENT
I.

TRIAL COUNSEL'S PERFORMANCE FELL BELOW AN
OBJECTIVE STANDARD OF REASONABLENESS AND AS A
RESULT GEUKGEUZIAN WAS DEPRIVED OF
CONSTITUTIONALLY GUARANTEED ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL.

Trial counsel's performance clearly fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness in two areas. First, trial counsel did not object to the jury instructions,
which failed to adequately instruct the jury as to the appropriate mens rea. Second, trial
counsel did not object to testimony solicited by the State and offered by Airman Lyon as
to Geukgeuzian's state of mind. Such errors prejudiced Geukgeuzian and deprived him
of a fair trial. The United States Supreme Court has established a two-part test to
determine whether a defendant was deprived of his Constitutional right to effective
assistance of counsel.
5

First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was
deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious
that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the
defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must
show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This
requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive
the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). This test for determining the
adequacy of trial counsel has been embraced and applied by Utah courts. See e.g., State
v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990). Despite the presumption of competence as
expressed in Strickland and its progeny, Utah courts have continually noted that appellate
courts "must review each case carefully to prevent the infrequent meritorious claim from
being reflexively swept into the tide of affirmance by the chronicles of probability."
State v. Moritzsky, 111 P.2d 688, 690 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Rather, the appellate court
must not "mechanically apply the two-part standard . . . but instead . . . 'focus upon the
fundamental fairness of the proceeding challenged. The purpose of the inquiry is simply
to insure that the defendant receives a fair trial.'" Id. (quoting State v. Frame, 723 P.2d
401, 405 (Utah 1986).
"The prejudice test for ineffective assistance of counsel claims is equivalent to the
harmfulness test applied in assessing plain error." State v. Parker, 4 P.3d 778, 780 (Utah
2000). To show ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must
(i) identify specific acts or omissions that fall below the standard of
reasonable professional assistance when considered at the time of the
act or omission and under all attendant circumstances, and (ii)
demonstrate that counsel's error prejudiced the defendant, i.e., that but
for the error, there is a reasonable probability that the verdict would
have been more favorable to the defendant.
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Id. at 781-82 (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1225 (Utah 1993)). When viewed in
this light, the record shows that the performance of Geukgeuzian's trial counsel not only
falls below an objective level of reasonableness, but also that there is a reasonable
likelihood that the result of the trial would have been different but for the ineffective
assistance.
a.

Trial Counsel's Performance in Failing to Object to the Jury
Instructions as Presented by the Trial Court Was Legally Deficient.

Under Utah Law, "a defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be
innocent until each element of the offense charged against him is proved beyond a
reasonable doubt... the words 'element of the offense' mean: (a) the conduct, attendant
circumstances, or results of conduct proscribed, prohibited or forbidden in the definition
of the offense; (b) the culpable mental state required." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501
(1973) (emphasis added). See also, American Fork v. Carr, 970 P.2d 717, 720 (Utah Ct.
App. 1998). ("When instructing the jury on the elements of the offense, the trial court
must specifically instruct the jury regarding the 'culpable mental state required' to
commit the offense."). Further, "[e]very offense not involving strict liability shall require
a culpable mental state, and when the offense does not specify a culpable mental state . . .
intent, knowledge, or recklessness shall suffice to establish criminal responsibility." Utah
Code Ann. §76-2-102(1983).
The instructions submitted to the jury were prejudicially inadequate. Geukgeuzian
was convicted of violating Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508 (witness tampering); an
examination of this statute in conjunction with the jury instructions demonstrates how the
7

instructions failed to adequately charge the jury regarding the requisite mental state.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508 states in pertinent part, "a person is guilty of a third degree
felony if, believing that an official proceeding or investigation is pending or about to be
instituted, he attempts to induce or otherwise cause a person to: (a) testify or inform
falsely; (b) withhold any testimony, information, document or item . . . " Id.
According to Instruction No. 29 of the instructions submitted to the jury by the
trial court1, in order to find Geukgeuzian guilty of the crime of tampering with a witness,
the jury must find all of the following elements, "1. That on or about May 15, 2000, in
Davis County, State of Utah: 2. The Defendant Stephen Lamar Geukgeuzian, believing
an official proceeding or investigation is pending or about to be instituted; 3. Attempted
to induce or other [sic] cause a person to: a. Testify or inform falsely; or b. Withhold any
testimony, information, document, or item." While the language of the instruction tracks
the language of the statute, there is no explanation regarding the culpable mental state
required for a conviction in this or any other instruction submitted.
In making a determination of guilt regarding tampering with a witness, there are in
reality two mental states that must be evaluated. The first is whether the person charged,
"believ[ed] that an official proceeding or investigation is pending or about to be instituted
. . ." Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508 (1). The law with regard to the requisite mental state
attached to this portion of the statute is clear, "the statute requires no more than a
defendant believe an official proceeding or investigation to be underway." State v.

1

A true and correct copy of the jury instructions has been provided in the Addendum.
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Bradley, 752 P.2d 874, 876-77 (Utah 1985). Geukgeuzian did not then, nor does he now
contend that he did not believe an official proceeding or investigation to be underway.
The second mental state relates to the acts or conduct prescribed by the statute.
The witness tampering statute, however, does not delineate what mental state is required.
Where a statute does not specifically identify a culpable mental state, "intent, knowledge,
or recklessness shall suffice to establish criminal responsibility." Utah Code Ann. § 762-102 (1983). Thus, there must be some level of knowledge, intent2, or recklessness
attached to Geukgeuzian's request for Lyon to provide a statement.
In determining which of these mental states apply to the witness tampering statute,
Utah courts have established that, to be convicted of tampering with a witness, a
defendant must "knowingly and intentionally [attempt] to induce or otherwise cause
another person to [testify or inform falsely; or] withhold any testimony, information,
document, or thing." State v. Tolman, 115 P.2d 422, 424 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (emphasis
added). See also Sate v. Danker, 599 P.2d 518, 519 (Utah 1979) (noting that to be found
guilty of witness tampering defendant would have to know her daughter would be a
witness in a subsequent proceeding; and that she told her daughter not to testify).
Further instruction as to the proper mental state to apply in this regard can be
gleaned from the Legislature's use of the word attempt as an element in the witness
tampering statute. Like any attempted crime, the requisite mental state to be applied with
regard to witness tampering should be the same—namely, a specific intent to induce the
2

Although Instruction No. 34 does define "intentionally," it is of little or no use to the
jury as it is not clear to which charge or portion thereof this definition applies.
9

identified acts. See e.g., State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843, 847 (Utah 1992) (noting historical
position of the Court that an attempt to commit a crime is an act done with the intent to
commit that crime). Thus, to be found guilty of attempting to induce the acts identified in
the statute, Geukgeuzian must logically have intended to induce a person to testify falsely
or withhold any testimony, information, document, or item to meet the elements of
attempting to induce these acts.
In the present case, there is no language in Instruction No. 29, or any other jury
instruction, delineating what mental state the defendant must possess to support a
conviction of attempting to induce or cause a person to inform falsely. Instruction No. 29
merely states in pertinent part, "attempted to induce or other cause a person to: a. Testify
or inform falsely; or b. Withhold any testimony, information, document, or item."
Accordingly the jury was not informed that in order to convict Geukgeuzian the jury
would have to find that he possessed a specific mental state. The jury was not informed
that mental state is an essential element that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Even had the jury somehow divined the necessity of finding that Geukgeuzian possessed
a specific mental state, it had no instruction about which mental state to require. Because
Geukgeuzian was tried for both witness tampering and providing a false written statement
the confusion concerning which mental state might apply to which offense increases
exponentially. In the end, members of the jury were left without guidance as to the
appropriate mens rea, and were free to apply whatever standard of mental culpability they
wished, from strict liability to criminal negligence.
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Accordingly trial counsel's performance was prejudicially deficient and satisfies
the first prong of the Strickland test. Trial counsel should have been alert and aware of
these deficiencies. Trial counsel had access to these instructions for review before they
were submitted to the jury. Likewise, trial counsel was present in court as the
instructions were read aloud to the jury. Yet at no time did trial counsel object to the lack
of mens rea instructions, which constitutes an essential element of the crimes charged for
which the prosecution bore the full burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Is there a rational explanation or tactical reason for trial counsel' s failure to object
to the omissions in the Instructions? Defending claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel often devolves into an appellate parlor game of concocting obscure and
labyrinthian after-the-fact tactical explanations for constitutionally deficient performance
of trial counsel. In the present case trial counsel's mind was devoid of any strategic or
tactical reason for failing to properly instruct the jury. In its review of Geukgeuzian's
case the Utah Supreme Court concluded that, "Geukgeuzian's [trial counsel's] failure to
include a separate mens rea element in his proposed instruction was most likely
inadvertent..." State v. Geukgeuzian, 86 P.3d 742, 745 (Utah 2004)(emphasis added).
Where no possible explanation or tactical reason exists for such a decision, Utah courts
have held that the first part of the Stricklandtest has been met. See e.g., State v. Templin,
805 P.2d 182, 188 (Utah 1990); State v. Maestas, 984 P.2d 376, 381 (Utah 1999).
b.

Trial Counsel's Deficient Performance Prejudiced Geukgeuzian and
Deprived Him the Opportunity of a Fair Trial

ll

The court must then look to the second prong of the Strickland tost, prejudice to
Geukgeuzian. Appropriate and complete the jury instructions would have provided the
jury with the proper mens rea requirements and would have allowed the jury to consider
the proper elements of the crime charged. As a result of trial counsel's errors, however,
jurors were free to insert whatever standard of culpability they wished, rather than
applying the proper standard as required by law. Accordingly, it is impossible to
determine on the basis of the record whether the jury applied the evidence to each
element that the prosecution was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Where
this Court cannot determine from the record whether the proper elements were
considered, there is a reasonable probability of a different result. See State v. Callahan,
866 P.2d 590, 595 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); see also State v. Finlayson, 994 P.2d 1243,
1249 (Utah 2000) (failure to object to jury instructions which identified incorrect
elements of crime sufficient to establish prejudice under Strickland).
The gravamen of the error of failing to include a mental state element instruction
is addressed in the case law surrounding the doctrine of manifest injustice3. While Rule
19(c) of the Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure generally prohibits appellate review of jury
instructions that were not adjudicated at trial, an exception is noted for cases involving
manifest injustice. Manifest injustice has been defined as errors, which are so
fundamental as to deprive a defendant of a fair trial. Utah courts have continually held
3

The reference to manifest injustice is not an attempt to reargue or dispute the decision of
the Supreme Court, which reversed this Court's prior ruling based on the doctrine of
invited error; rather the reference is illustrative of the seriousness of the prejudice which
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that a failure to give an elements instruction for a crime constitutes manifest injustice and
reversible error as a matter of law. State v. Gibson, 908 P.2d 352, 354 (Utah Ct. App
1995)(quoting State v. Jones, 823 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah 1991)).
When the same failure to instruct the jury on the requisite mental state element of
the crime charged is evaluated for prejudice under the second prong of the Strickland test
the same conclusion should result. Failure to instruct on mental state is such a
fundamental flaw that as a matter of law, it is sufficiently prejudicial to satisfy the second
prong. By its nature, failure to instruct a jury on the essential element of the mental state
applicable to the crime charged deprived Geukgeuzian of a fair trial.
e.

Trial Counsel's Failure to Object to Prosecutor's Line of Questioning
to Airman Lyon Regarding Geukgeuzian's Knowledge Constituted
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.

During the Prosecutor's direct questioning of Airman Lyon, the prosecutor asked
Airman Lyon, "Going back to when you heard the threats and the things that you made
statements about, was Steven aware that you were around when you made those
statements?" (R. 00141: 31, lines 18-20.) To which Airman Lyon responded, "yes, sir."
(R. 00141: 31, line 21.) The Prosecutor followed, "and so he would, and so he, when he
asked you, as far as you're concerned when he asked you to write this statement he was
asking you to write something that he knew was false." (R. 00141: 31, lines 22-24.)
(emphasis added.) To which Airman Lyon responded, "yes, sir." (R. 00141: 31, line 25.)
At no time during this exchange did trial counsel object to the line of questioning, either

Utah courts have accorded to deficient instructions on the requisite mental state element
of a crime.
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on grounds of foundation, leading question or speculation. As a result, the jury was
allowed to hear, and consider without a curative instruction, a statement attributing a state
of mind to the defendant, which was supported by no other evidence before the court.
Utah R. Evid. 602 states "a witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is
introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the
matter." Id. No evidence was introduced to support a contention to the effect that
Airman Lyon had any personal knowledge whatsoever regarding whether Appellant was
aware Airman Lyon was present when Appellant allegedly made threatening statements
about his wife. Nor was there any evidence introduced to establish the personal
knowledge of Airman Lyon that Appellant was asking him to "write something that he
knew was false." The fact that trial counsel failed to object to such a clear violation of
the Utah Rules of Evidence is sufficient to satisfy the first prong of the Strickland test.
See e.g., Callahan, 866 P.2d at 595 (failure of counsel to object to prosecutor's
questioning in trial likely fails to meet the standard of reasonable representation).
d.

Trial Counsel's Deficient Performance in Failing to Object to
Questioning Prejudiced Geukgeuzian and Deprived Him of a Fair
Trial

When viewed in light of all attendant circumstances, trial counsel's failure to
object to this line of questioning clearly resulted in significant prejudice to Appellant.
Throughout this brief, Appellant has maintained and established that the failure to
instruct the jury as to the elements of the crimes charged resulted in prejudice to the
Appellant. While the failure to object to a line of questioning may be sustained under
other circumstances as a "reasonable trial strategy", under the attendant circumstances in
14

this matter, trial counsel's error clearly affected the ability of the jury to reach a
trustworthy verdict. See Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1225.
The key issue at trial was whether Appellant knowingly induced a person to testify
or inform falsely under Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508. By failing to object to the identified
line of questioning, the danger of the jury misapplying the facts to the unidentified mental
state elements of the crime charged was exacerbated to an unacceptable level. Had trial
counsel objected to this line of questioning, it is unlikely that the jury would have reached
a verdict based on Airman Lyon's testimony that he never told Geukgeuzian that the
statement was untrue and Geukgeuzian's testimony the he never asked Lyon to do or say
anything which Appellant believed to be untrue. By failing to object to a line of
questioning where the witness was invited to speculate as to Geukgeuzian's knowledge at
the time the writings were made, trial counsel created a situation where the jury verdict is
suspect and, but for these errors, the outcome of the trial would likely be different.
As a result of trial counsel's clear failure to provide effective assistance and the
prejudice suffered by Geukgeuzian as a result, Geukgeuzian is entitled to a reversal of his
witness tampering conviction.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Appellant respectfully requests this Court reverse the
witness tampering conviction of the lower court and remand for a new trial.

15

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _/&_ day of September 2004.

;

>^sS

Kendall S. Peterson
Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this _[±_ day of September 2004,1 caused to be
delivered by regular first class mail, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief to the
following:
Mark Shurtleff, Utah Attorney General
Fred Voros, Asst. Atty. General
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

Westiaw.
UT ST §
76-8-508
U.C.A. 1953 §
76-8-508

c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentnoss
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code
*il Chapter £. Offenses Against The Administration of Government
*ii Parr 5.

Falsification in Official Matters

••§
76-8-508. Tampering
bribe

with w i t n e s s — R e c e i v i n g

or

soliciting

a

(1) A person is guilty of the third degree felony of tampering with
witness if, believing that an official proceeding or investigation
pending or about to be instituted, or with the intent to prevent
official
proceeding
or
investigation,
he
attempts
to
induce
otherwise cause another person to:

a
is
an
or

(a) testify or inform falsely;
(b) withhold any testimony, information, document, or item;
(c) elude legal process summoning him to provide evidence;
(d) absent himself
has been summoned.

from

any proceeding

or

investigation

or
to

which

he

(2) A person is guilty of the third degree felony of soliciting or
receiving a bribe as a witness if he solicits, accepts, or agrees to
accept any benefit in consideration of his doing any of the acts
specified under Subsection (1).

(3) The offense of tampering with a witness or soliciting or receiving
a bribe under this section does not merge with any other substantive
offense committed in the course of committing any offense under this
section.
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JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Plaintiff,

Case No. 001700592
Judge: MICHAEL G. ALLPHIN

vs.
STEPHEN LAMAR GEUKGEUZIAN,
Defendant.

Ladies and Gentlemen: Attached hereto are instructions numbered one through
twenty-seven, given to you at the beginning of the trial. Additional instructions numbered 28
through

V /

will be included at a later time in the proceedings. Taken together, these

instructions govern your conduct and deliberations during the trial of this case and must be
carefully followed.
Dated this J-

day of _

, 2000.
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JURY INSTRUCTIONS

1.

GENERAL INSTRUCTION

There are certain laws and rules which apply to this case. I'll explain them to you from time
to time during the trial. Please pay careful attention. Each of you has been given a copy of these
instructions. This copy is yours to keep. As I read these instructions to you, please follow along on
your copy. Keep in mind the following points:
Many Instructions. There will be many instructions. All are equally important. Don't pick
out one and ignore the rest. Think about each instruction in the context of all the others.
Obey Instructions, You must obey the instructions. You are not allowed to reach decisions
that go against the law.
Gender - Singular-/Plural. In these instructions, the masculine gender such as "he" or
"him"includes the feminine "she" or "her" and the singular such as "defendant" includes the
plural "defendants" when appropriate.
Note Taking. You may take notes during the trial, but don't over do it, and don't let it
distract you from following the evidence. The use of notes in the jury room to refresh your
memory is perfectly acceptable. But let me caution you not to rely excessively upon your
notes. The lawyers will review important evidence in their closing arguments and help you
focus on that which is most relevant to your decision. I also caution that notes are not
evidence. Use them only to aid personal memory or concentration. One juror's opinion
should not be given excessive consideration solely because that juror has taken notes.
Keep an Open Mind. Don't form an opinion about the ultimate issues in this case until you
have listened to all the evidence and the lawyers' summaries, along with the instructions on
the law. Keep an open mind until then.

2.

WHAT RULES APPLY TO RECESSES

From time to time I will call for a recess. It may be for a few minutes, a lunch break,
overnight or longer. During recesses, do not talk about this case with anyone; not family, friends
or even each other. The Clerk may ask you to wear a badge identifying yourself as a juror so that
people will not try to discuss the case with you. Don't mingle with the lawyers, the parties, the
witnesses or anyone else connected with the case. You may say "hello", or exchange similar
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greetings or civilities with these persons, but don't engage in conversations. Don't accept from or
give to any of these persons any favors, however slight, such as rides or food. Finally, don't read
about this case in the newspaper or listen to or watch any reports on television or radio. These
constraints are necessary for a fair trial.

3.

THE GENERAL ROLE OF THE JUDGE, THE JURY AND THE LAWYERS

The judge, the jury and the lawyers are all officers of the Court and play important roles in
the trial.
Judge. It is my role as judge to decide all legal issues, supervise the trial and instruct the
jury on the LAW that it must apply.
Jury. It is your role as the jury to follow that law and decide the factual issues. Factual
issues generally relate to WHO, WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, HOW or similar things
concerning which evidence will be presented.
Lawyers. It is the role of the lawyers to present evidence, generally by calling and
questioning witnesses and presenting exhibits. Each lawyer will also try to persuade you to
accept his version of the facts and to decide the case in favor of his client.
Keep in mind that neither the lawyers nor I actually decide the case, because that is your role.
Don't be influenced by what you think our personal opinions are; rather, you decide the case based
upon the law explained in these instructions and the evidence presented in court.

4.

OUTLINE OF THE TRIAL

The trial will generally proceed as follows:
Opening Statements. The lawyers will outline what the case is about and indicate what
they think the evidence will show.
Presentation of Evidence. The plaintiff will offer its evidence first followed by the
defendant. Each side may also offer rebuttal evidence after hearing the witnesses and
seeing the exhibits offered by the other side.
Instructions on the Law. After each side has presented its evidence, I will supplement
these written instructions and review them with you.
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Closing Arguments. The lawyers will then summarize and argue the case. They will
share with you their respective views of the evidence, how it relates to the law and how
they think you should decide the case.
Jury Deliberation. The final step is for you to retire to the jury room and deliberate
until you reach a verdict.

5.

THE CHARGE and THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
The defendant in this case has been accused of committing a crime. The
accusation is in a written document called an INFORMATION, which will be read or
summarized for you following this instruction. As you listen, keep in mind that the
defendant has answered the charge by saying "not guilty." The defendant is presumed to
be innocent of the charge.

[THE INFORMATION WILL NOW BE READ TO THE JURY]
COUNT 1
TAMPERING WITH A WITNESS, as follows: That on or about May 15, 2000, at the
place aforesaid, the defendant believing that an official proceeding or investigation is pending or
about to be instituted, attempted to induce or otherwise cause a person to: testify or inform
falsely; or withhold any testimony, information, document, item.
COUNT 2
WRITTEN FALSE STATMENT, as follows: That on or about May 18, 2000, at the place
aforesaid, the defendant intending to deceive a public servant in the performance of his official
function, made or caused to be made a written false statement which defendant did not believe to
be true, knowingly created a false impression in a written application for a pecuniary or other
benefit by omitting information necessary to prevent statements therein from being misleading or
submitted or invited reliance upon a writing which defendant knew to be lacking in authenticity,
or upon a sample, map, boundary mark, or other object which he knew to be false.

6.

WHAT IS THE JURY'S ROLE IN THIS CASE?

You must decide whether the charge against the defendant has been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. Your decision is called a VERDICT. Your verdict must be based only on the
evidence produced here in court. It must be based on facts, not on speculation. Don't guess about
any fact. However, you may draw reasonable inferences or arrive at reasonable conclusions
from the evidence presented.
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7.

WHAT IS EVIDENCE?

Evidence is anything that tends to prove or disprove the existence of a disputed fact. It
can be testimony, or documents, or objects, or photographs, or stipulations, or certain qualified
opinions, or any combination of these things. Sometimes the lawyers may agree that certain
facts exist. You should accept any agreed or stipulated facts as having been proved. In limited
instances, I may take "judicial notice" of a well-known fact. If this happens, I will explain how
you should treat it.
Two classes of evidence are recognized and admitted in courts of law, upon either or both
of which a jury may lawfully base its findings, whether favorable to the State or to the defendant.
One type of evidence is known as direct and the other as circumstantial. The law makes
no distinction between the two classes as to the degree of proof required for conviction or as to
their effectiveness in defendant's favor, but respects each for such convincing force as it may
carry and accepts each as a reasonable method of proof.
Direct evidence of a person's conduct at any time in question consists of the testimony of
every witness who, with any of his own physical senses, perceived such conduct or any part
thereof, and which testimony describes or relates what thus was perceived. All other evidence
admitted in the trial is circumstantial in relation to such conduct, and, insofar as it shows any act,
statement or other conduct, or any circumstances of fact, tending to prove by reasonable
inference the innocense or guilt of the defendant, it may be considered by you in arriving at a
verdict.

8.

OPINION TESTIMONY

Under certain circumstances, witnesses are allowed to express an opinion. A person who
by education, study or experience has become an expert in any art, science or profession, may
give his opinion and the reason for it. A layman (or, a non-expert) is also allowed to express an
opinion if it is based on personal observations and it is helpful to understanding his testimony or
the case. You are not bound to believe anyone's opinion. Consider it as you would any other
evidence, and give it the weight you think it deserves.

9.

WHAT IS NOT TO BE CONSIDERED OR USED AS EVIDENCE?

I've explained to you what evidence is. Now I'll tell you about some things which do not
qualify as evidence or which, for some other good reason, you should not consider in reaching
your verdict.
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Accusation. The fact that formal charges have been filed accusing the defendant of
committing a crime is not evidence of guilt. The defendant is a competent witness in the
defendant's own behalf, and the fact that the defendant is charged with the commission of
a crime should not be regarded by you as tending to impeach or discredit the defendant's
testimony.
Punishment. You may be aware of the gravity of the offense charged and the range of
potential penalties, but you should not consider what actual punishment the defendant
may receive if found guilty. That is for the judge to decide based upon the applicable law.
Right to Remain Silent. If the defendant chooses not to testify in this case, don't consider
that as evidence of guilt. The Constitution provides that an accused person has the right
not to testify and you should not draw any negative inferences based upon the reliance on
this right.
Lawyer Statements. What the lawyers say is not evidence. Their purpose is to give you a
preview of expected evidence and to help you understand the evidence from their
viewpoint.
Personal Investigation. Evidence is not what you can find out on your own. You should
not make any investigation about the facts in this case. Do not make personal inspections,
observations or experiments. Do not view premises, things or articles not produced in
court. Don't let anyone else do anything like this for you. Don't look for information in
law books, dictionaries or public or private records which are not produced in court.
Out of Court Information. Do not consider anything you may have heard or read about
this case in the media or by word of mouth or other out-of-court communication. You
must rely solely on the evidence that is produced and received in court.

10.

THE JUDGE DECIDES WHAT EVIDENCE IS ADMISSIBLE

Sometimes a question will be raised about whether certain evidence is proper for the jury
to consider. This type of question is called an OBJECTION. I rule on objections. If an objection
is SUSTAINED the evidence is kept out and you should not consider it. If an objection is
OVERRULED the evidence comes in and you may consider it. If evidence is STRICKEN you
should ignore it.

[OPENING STATEMENTS BY COUNSEL]
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11.

HOW TO MAKE DECISIONS ABOUT THE EVIDENCE

Once evidence is admitted, you must decide three things about it: Whether it should be
believed, how important it is, and what you can infer or conclude from it.
Use your common sense as a reasonable person in making these decisions. Review all the
evidence. Don't imagine things which have no evidence to back them up. Consider the evidence
fairly without any bias or sympathy toward either side.

12.

DECIDING WHETHER TO BELIEVE A WITNESS

As each witness testifies, you must decide how accurate that testimony is. It may help
you to ask yourself questions such as these:
Personal Interest. Does the witness have a personal interest in how the trial comes out?
Other Bias. Does the witness have some other bias or motive to testify a certain way?
Demeanor:
What impression is made by the witness's appearance and conduct while
answering questions?
Consistency. Did the witness make conflicting statements or contradict other evidence?
Knowledge and Memory. Did the witness have a good opportunity to know the facts and
the ability to remember them?
Reasonableness. Is the testimony reasonable in light of human experience?
You're not required to believe all that a witness says. You are entitled to believe one
witness as against many or many as against one, in accordance with your honest convictions.

13.

WHAT IF A WITNESS PURPOSELY GIVES FALSE TESTIMONY?

If you believe a witness has purposely given false testimony about anything relevant to
the case, you may disregard not only the false testimony but the remaining testimony from that
witness unless it is corroborated by other evidence; in which event you should give it what
weight you think it deserves.
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14.

WHO IS RESPONSIBLE TO CONVINCE THE JURY?

The prosecution has the burden of proof It is the one making the accusations in this case.
The defendant is not required to prove innocence - you must start by assuming it. According to
our law, the defendant is presumed to be innocent unless proven guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. This is a humane provision of the law intended to guard against the danger of an innocent
person being unjustly punished.

15.

HOW CONVINCED MUST THE JURY BE BEFORE DECIDING THE
DEFENDANT IS GUILTY?

Before you can give up your assumption that the defendant is innocent, you must be
convinced that the defendant's guilt has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Proof beyond a
reasonable doubt is that degree of proof which satisfies the mind and convinces the
understanding of reasonable persons who are bound to act conscientiously upon it.

16.

WHAT IS A REASONABLE DOUBT?

A reasonable doubt is one based upon reason and common sense rather than speculation,
supposition, emotion or sympathy. It is the kind of doubt that would make a reasonable person
hesitate to act. It must be real and not merely imaginary. It is such as would be retained by
reasonable men and women after a full and impartial consideration of all the evidence, and must
arise from the evidence or lack of evidence in the case.

17.

HOW TO EVALUATE DOUBT

If after such full and impartial consideration some possible doubt exists, you must
determine whether such doubt is reasonable in light of all the evidence. Ask yourselves if the
doubt is consistent with reason and common sense. The law does not require that the evidence
dispel all possible or conceivable doubt, but rather that it dispel all reasonable doubt. That is
what is meant by the phrase "proof beyond a reasonable doubt".

[THE EVIDENCE WILL NOW BE PRESENTED]
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18.

INSTRUCTIONS ON THE LAW THAT APPLIES TO THIS CASE

The clerk has attached to your copy of these instructions some additional pages which
contain instructions relating to the particular laws or rules that apply in this case. These
additional instructions begin with instruction number twenty-eight (28). We will read those after
completing our review of the following instructions which relate essentially to the procedure that
you should follow.

19.

THE JUDGE IS IMPARTIAL

The Constitution and the laws of this state absolutely prohibit the trial judge from making
any comment about the witnesses or the evidence and I am not in any way permitted to assist you
in determining what is or is not the truth in this case.
Therefore, you are instructed that if during the trial I have said or done anything which
has suggested to you that I am inclined to favor the claim or position of either party, you are not
to permit yourselves to be influenced by any such suggestion.
I have not intended to indicate any opinion as to which witnesses are, or are not, worthy
of belief, nor which party should prevail. If any expression of mine has seemed to indicate an
opinion relative to any of these matters, you should disregard it, because you are the sole and
only judges of the facts.

20.

WHAT TO TAKE WITH YOU INTO THE JURY ROOM

You may take the following things with you when you go into the jury room to discuss
this case:
a.

all exhibits admitted in evidence;

b.

your notes (if any);

c.

your copy of these instructions; and

d.

the verdict form or forms.

Page 8

21.

WHAT TO DO IN THE JURY ROOM

The first thing you should do in the jury room is choose a person to be in charge. This
person is called the "Foreperson" or the "Chair." The Chair's duties are:
a.

To keep order and allow everyone a chance to speak;

b.

To represent the jury in any communications you make; and

c.

to sign your verdict and bring it back in court.

In deciding what the verdict should be, all jurors are equal. The Chair has no more power
than any other juror.

22.

CONSIDER EACH OTHER'S OPINION, THEN REACH YOUR OWN
DECISION BASED UPON HONEST DELIBERATION

It is rarely productive or good for a juror, upon entering the jury room, to make an
emphatic expression of opinion or to announce a determination to stand for a certain verdict.
When that is done at the outset, a person's sense of pride may block appropriate consideration of
the case. Use your common memory, your common understanding and your common sense. Talk
about the case with each other as you ponder and deliberate.
Your verdict must be your own. Don't make a decision just to agree with everyone else.
However, you should respect and consider the opinions of the other jurors. If you are persuaded
that a decision you initially made was wrong, don't hesitate to change your mind. Help each other
arrive at the truth. Also, don't resort to chance or some form of decision-making other than
honest deliberation.

23.

WHAT TO DO IF YOU HAVE QUESTIONS DURING DELIBERATION

If you think you need more information or a clarification, write a note and give it to the
bailiff. I will review it with the lawyers. We will answer your question whenever appropriate.
However, these instructions should contain all the information you need to reach a verdict based
upon the evidence.

24.

FOCUS ON THIS CASE ALONE

Your duty is to decide this case and this case alone. You should not use this case as a
forum for correcting perceived wrongs in other cases, or as a means of expressing individual or
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collective views about anything other than the guilt or innocence of this defendant. Your verdict
should reflect the facts as found by you applied to the law as explained in these instructions and
should not be distorted by any outside factors or objectives.
The final test of the quality of your service will be the verdict you return. You will
contribute to efficient judicial administration if you focus exclusively on this case and return a
just and proper verdict.

25.

REACHING A VERDICT

This being a criminal case, your verdict must be unanimous; all jurors must agree. When
you are all in agreement, then you have reached a verdict and your work is finished.

26.

HOW TO REPORT YOUR VERDICT

When you have reached a verdict, the Chair should date and sign the verdict form which
corresponds to your decision. Then notify the bailiff that you are ready to return to court.

27.

WHAT HAPPENS AFTER THE VERDICT HAS BEEN REPORTED

After you have given your verdict to the judge, he or the clerk may ask each of you about
it to make sure you agree with it. Then you will be excused from the jury box and you may leave
at any time. You may remain in the courtroom, if you wish, to watch the rest of the proceedings,
which should be quite brief.
After you are excused, you may talk about the case with anyone. Likewise, you are not
required to talk about it. If anyone attempts to talk to you about the case when you don't want to
do that, please tell the Court Clerk.
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INSTRUCTION NO

£.

These instructions contain the law that governs you in this case. In determining the facts,
you may consider only the evidence given at this trial. Evidence which was rejected by me or
ordered stricken out by me may not be considered by you.
Not one of these instructions states all of the law of this case, but all of them must be
taken and considered together inasmuch as they are connected with and relate to each other.
You should not be concerned with the wisdom of any rule of law. Regardless of your
own opinion, it would be a violation of your sworn duty to base you verdict upon any other view
of the law than that given in my instructions.

INSTRUCTION N O ^ A ^

Before you can convict defendant, Stephen Lamar Geukgeuzian, of TAMPERING WITH
A WITNESS, as charged in Count 1 of the Information, you must find from the evidence beyond
a reasonable doubt, all of the following elements of the crime:
1.

That on or about May 15, 2000, in Davis County, State of Utah:

2.

The Defendant Stephen Lamar Geukguzian, believing that an official proceeding
or investigation is pending or about to be instituted;

3.

Attempted to induce or other cause a person to:
a.

Testify or inform falsely; or

b.

Withhold any testimony, information, document, or item.

If, after careful consideration of all the evidence in this case, you are convinced of the
truth of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must
find the defendant, Stephen Lamar Geukgeuzian, guilty of TAMPERING WITH A WITNESS, as
charged in Count 1 of the Information.
If, on the other hand, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are
not convinced of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then
you must find the defendant, Stephen Lamar Geukgeuzian, not guilty of TAMPERING WITH A
WITNESS, as charged in Count 1 of the Information.

INSTRUCTION NO.

J&

Before you can convict defendant, Stephen Lamar Geukgeuzian, of FALSE WRITTEN
STATEMENT, as charged in Count 2 of the Information, you must find from the evidence
beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the following elements of the crime:
1.

That on or about May l£, 2000, in Davis County, State of Utah:

2.

The Defendant Stephen Lamar Geukguzian, intending to deceive a public servant
in the performance of his official function;
a.

Made or caused to be made a written false statement which defendant did
not believe to be true; or

b.

Submitted or invited reliance upon a writing which defendant knew to be
lacking in authenticity.

If, after careful consideration of all the evidence in this case, you are convinced of the
truth of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must
find the defendant, Stephen Lamar Geukgeuzian, guilty of FALSE WRITTEN STATEMENT, as
charged in Count 2 of the Information.
If, on the other hand, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are
not convinced of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then
you must find the defendant, Stephen Lamar Geukgeuzian, not guilty of FALSE WRITTEN
STATEMENT, as charged in Count 2 of the Information.

INSTRUCTION NO.

No person shall be guilty of WRITTEN FALSE STATEMENT, if he retracts the
falsification before it becomes manifest that the falsification was or would be exposed.

INSTRUCTION NO. ^ 2

When it is charged that a crime was committed on or about a certain date, if the jury finds
that the crime was committed by a defendant, the proof need not show that it was committed at
the time so alleged, but may be proved to have been committed sometime on or about the date
alleged.

INSTRUCTION NO. 3 3

A Domestic Relations Commissioner and other court personnel at a hearing regarding an
application for a protective order are public servants acting in their official function.

INSTRUCTION NO.

2£

A person engages in conduct:
Intentionally, with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when
it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.

INSTRUCTION NO

jr

Intent, being a state of mind, is seldom susceptible of proof by direct and positive
evidence and may ordinarily be inferred from acts, conduct, statement and circumstances.

INSTRUCTION NO

Me

In arriving at a verdict in this case, you shall not discuss or consider the subject of penalty
or punishment, as that is a matter which lies with the court and other governmental agencies, and
must not in any way affect your decision as to the innocence or guilt of the defendant.

INSTRUCTION NO

n

Your verdict in this case must be in writing, signed by your foreperson and returned by
you into the court. Your verdict must be as follows:

COUNT 1
GUILTY of TAMPERING WITH A WITNESS,
OR
NOT GUILTY of TAMPERING WITH A WITNESS
COUNT2
GUILTY of WRITTEN FALSE STATEMENT
OR
NOT GUILTY of WRITTEN FALSE STATEMENT.
This being a criminal case, each and every juror is required to find a verdict of guilty. If

Cannot
there is not a unanimous verdict of 'guilty' by all jurors, then you Bana find the defendant'

Wty'.
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